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There is much to be gained from interdisciplinary efforts to tackle complex
psychological notions such as ‘theory of mind’ by combining the rich history
of study and debates in cognitive science and recent findings from AI research.
However, careful and consistent communication is essential when comparing
artificial and biological intelligence, say Henry Shevlin and Marta Halina.
Many of the most promising approaches in cognitive science seek to explicate
notions like perception, belief, and motivation in information processing terms
[1]. A similar move from information processing to psychology is occurring in
artificial intelligence (AI) research and machine learning. Currently, few people
working in AI would literally attribute beliefs, thoughts, or feelings to machines.
However, as new techniques extend the capabilities of artificial systems, it has
become increasingly common to use psychological terms to describe processing
architectures [2–6].
Such use of psychological terms in AI research may be in many cases justified
and unproblematic. Some terms with both narrow computational and psycho-
logical meanings, such as “memory” and “reinforcement”, have clearly distinct
histories in psychology and artificial intelligence and their senses are unlikely
to be confused. Others such as “learning” and “behavior” straddle psychology
and artificial intelligence, but are broad enough that there is little reason to
quibble with their use to describe machine capacities. However, we argue here
that there is a third kind of more robustly psychological concepts—including
notions like awareness, perception, agency, and theory of mind—that have rich
and complex histories in cognitive science. We suggest that these terms – which
we call rich psychological concepts—require greater caution when employed to
describe the capabilities of machine intelligence.
1 From psychology to AI and back
Our first concern for the use of rich psychological terms in artificial intelligence
comes from the fact that for many such concepts (for example, theory of mind,
or perception) there is already considerable controversy in cognitive science as
to whether and when they can be applied even to biological organisms other
than humans. In order to maintain consistency and clear communication across
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different branches of cognitive science, it is thus key for artificial intelligence
researchers who wish to employ these concepts to do so with an awareness of
the standards of evidence and proof applied to them by researchers concerned
with biological intelligence. More positively, we would also suggest that many
in the machine learning community might gain insights into the development of
sophisticated artificial intelligences by paying close attention to these debates.
Consider, for example, the debate concerning theory of mind (ToM) in non-
human animals. In 1978, Premack and Woodruff asked whether chimpanzees
have a ToM or the ability to attribute mental states to others—such as goals,
knowledge, and beliefs [7]. The challenges involved in answering this question
quickly became apparent, however, as researchers realised there were multiple
available explanations for subjects’ successful performance on ToM tasks. A
subject could pass a false belief task, for example, by applying a behavioural
rule, such as “an agent will choose the container that had the preferred reward
placed into it while that agent was present” [8]. In grappling with this prob-
lem, psychologists developed alternative paradigms and standards for testing
ToM. New experimental approaches, such as experience-projection tasks were
designed to dissociate the attribution of mental states from the application of
behavioural rules [9, 10]. Forty years and numerous studies later, a consensus is
beginning to emerge that chimpanzees have the ability to attribute some mental
states to others [11], although not everyone agrees [12]. Crucially for our pur-
poses, however, the above challenges have led to a more nuanced understanding
of ToM and how to test for it.
Recently, AI researchers have been exploring the idea of building an artificial
theory of mind [4, 13, 14]. The results of these studies are impressive, with
machines capable of predicting the behaviour of agents they have never seen
before. Researchers working in this area draw heavily on contemporary work in
cognitive science in order to guide the development and assessment of machine
ToM [4, 14]. Engaging with cognitive science in this way provides AI developers
with a rich database of theories, mechanisms, behaviours, and experimental
tasks [15].
We think this is the right approach and would like to encourage more engage-
ment of this kind. In the case of ToM research, for example, an artificial system
like that developed by Rabinowitz and colleagues 2018 is an excellent example
of how well an artificial system can learn to predict social behaviour. Within
the context of a simple gridworld, their “Theory of Mind neural network” or
ToMnet was able to pass traditional ToM tasks (including a false belief task)
after being trained on no more than a population of behaving agents. The fact
that psychologists would characterize ToMnet as engaging in behavior reading,
rather than attributing mental states, does not diminish the significance of this
development. Quite the contrary: one of the extraordinary implications of this
study it that it demonstrates that an agent can pass traditional ToM tests using
behaviour reading alone. Psychologists have hypothesized that this is possible,
but have not demonstrated it empirically, as they lack full knowledge of an or-
ganism’s learning history. AI research such as this can provide greater insight
into the learning and cognitive mechanisms potentially involved in ToM in hu-
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mans and other animals. In this case, perhaps one need not represent mental
states in order to achieve sophisticated social behaviour after all.
While we see this example as constituting a success story for the use of
rich psychological terms by AI researchers, the model it provides has not yet
been consistently adopted by the field. While we do not wish to single out
individual publications for practices that are widespread, we would note a quick
glimpse at almost any leading machine learning publication will reveal frequent
reference made to rich psychological concepts like understanding, motivation,
and even creativity, without the same care and attention exhibited by studies
like those mentioned above. This risks miscommunication and cross-purpose in
interdisciplinary attempts to understand the basis of psychological capacities
and in comparing the capacities of artificial and biological intelligences.
A key point to acknowledge here is that those working in artificial intelli-
gence frequently have a kind of privileged access to the inner workings of the
cognitive systems they build, an advantage not enjoyed in the field of animal
behavior. Thus, perhaps AI researchers have special insight into cognitive mech-
anisms. This advantage should not be overstated, however. For one, there are
well-known issues with the interpretability of artificial neural networks, such
that the precise cognitive structures of artificial systems may not be fully trans-
parent even to their creators [16]. More fundamentally, however, there is consid-
erable debate concerning the underlying cognitive structure of capacities such as
theory of mind or perception even in adult humans, with extensive fine-grained
behavioural measures being our only current reliable test for their presence [17].
Hence simply knowing how a machine arrives at a given output does not auto-
matically warrant the conclusion that the relevant process can be understood
under the same psychological concept as that applied to adult humans. We
therefore suggest that machine learning experts continue to engage closely with
the standards of behavioural testing and theoretical wrangling found in other
domains of cognitive science, and, in so doing, contribute their expertise and
insights to these debates.
2 Normative dimensions of rich psychological terms
A second reason for diligence, we would suggest, is that some – and perhaps all –
rich psychological term are ‘thick concepts’ [18], bringing with them normative
considerations and hence the potential for ethical and legal ramifications. This
is not the case for more practical concepts such as memory or learning, of course,
but when we speak of a system as having intrinsic motivations, being an agent, or
displaying imagination, there is a risk of implicitly licensing inferences about the
moral or intellectual status of the system in question. Thus when authors speak
of “intrinsically motivated [artificial] agents” [19], a natural but unwarranted
(and doubtless unintended) assumption might be that the systems in question
literally possess goals, desires, and perhaps even a form of moral responsibility.
Similarly, when systems that learn with model-based reinforcement learning are
described as having “imagination” [2], an incautious reader may leap to the
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conclusion that the system in question possesses a capacity for the kinds of
intellectual insight we associate with some of the most dramatic feats of human
intelligence.
The machine learning community should not be held responsible for media
sensationalism or misinterpretations of its claims, of course. However, we would
suggest a pragmatic interest for researchers in avoiding terminology easily asso-
ciated with human-level intellectual capacities or moral or agential status. Given
the highly technical nature of most artificial systems, policymakers and the sci-
entific media are often ill-placed to evaluate when such terms are used in an
everyday, common sense way and when they are employed with a specific tech-
nical or scientific meaning. Gaps in understanding between the technical com-
munities and the general public thus risks inviting moral panics, ill-considered
legislation, and, more prosaically, disillusionment and squeezes in funding if and
when technology fails to live up to misguided expectations. On these grounds,
then, we suggest that it is in the interests of AI researchers to take particular
care when invoking such rich psychological concepts.
3 Different kinds of intelligence
Finally, and most speculatively, we suggest that by overeagerly attributing fa-
miliar psychological notions to machine intelligence we may miss new and poten-
tially illuminating information processing structures developed by AI research-
ers. To illustrate this point, compare current models of AI object recognition
with their biological equivalents. The ability to spontaneously acquire new cat-
egories and apply them to inputs from external sensors is common to humans,
animals, and many artificial systems.
Underlying this shared functional capacity, however, are key differences at
the level of mechanism. For example, in order to reliably recognize a given ob-
ject, artificial systems typically require a much larger set of training examples
than humans or animals, and the kind of one-shot learning that is common
in nature is extremely challenging for current computational architectures [20].
Similarly, contemporary artificial approaches to object recognition are easy to
fool via the use of adversarial examples, while no clear parallel exists for biolo-
gical perception (however, see [21] for some parallels). Artificial systems are also
in many cases poor at extrapolating from natural images to cartoons or other
pictorial forms of representation, a striking difference from the human case.
Yet there are also advantages of current machine systems over their biological
counterparts, notably in speed and accuracy at classification among real world
examples. Indeed, there is no reason some possible novel biological or artificial
system to which we would comfortably ascribe general intelligence should have
perceptual systems more like those found in animals and humans than those in
current machine vision systems.
In light of this, we should take seriously the possibility that new rich psycho-
logical terms might be better suited to application in artificial systems. While it
might be tempting to think of our repertoire of everyday psychological concepts
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as static, even in the human case, science has regularly led us to innovate in this
regard: notions like implicit bias, associative learning, and motivated reasoning
have found their way into everyday explanations of behavior, but were initially
coined by psychological researchers. Similar theoretical innovations might allow
us to develop a set of new high-level psychological concepts able to capture the
specific functional dynamics of artificial systems and allow for useful generaliz-
ations about their role in systems.
To get a sense of how such psychological neologisms might be put to work,
consider the differences mentioned above between current machine vision sys-
tems and human perception. As noted, both forms of sensing have their own
advantages and disadvantages. While human vision rarely results in the kinds of
radical errors associated with adversarial examples (we are unlikely to mistake
a toaster for an emu), in certain contexts it may be more prone to false negat-
ives, as demonstrated by the recent outperformance of humans by AI in many
medical imaging tasks [22]. In describing the sensory capacities of an artificial
system, then, it might be more helpful – and more explanatory – to eschew
reference to perception per se in favor of a new concept that more accurately
captures the kinds of distinctive epistemological advantages and disadvantages
of machine vision. By expanding our psychological vernacular to accommodate
the burgeoning variety of high-level cognitive processes in artificial intelligence,
we not only stand to gain in our ability to accurately characterize artificial
systems, but might also in turn find applications for these new concepts in
categorizing and understanding other kinds of non-human cognitive processes;
these might include those of biological creatures quite different from ourselves,
such as eusocial insects or cephalopods [23].
4 Conclusion
In summary, we claim that care should be taken before we employ the kind of
psychological vocabulary currently applied to humans and animals to artificial
systems, on the grounds that it may (i) impair scientific communication and un-
derstanding, (ii) invite premature conclusions of ethical or legal significance, and
(iii) lead us to miss opportunities to expand our understanding of the varieties
of minds.
It is commonly noted that previous ‘AI winters’ have been produced not so
much by scientific stagnation as mismatches in expectations between research-
ers and broader academic and social communities. Ensuring such expectations
are realistic by, among other things, reining in current tendencies to invoke rich
psychological concepts to describe artificial systems will, we believe, help foster
a more sustainable dialogue between researchers, funding bodies, and society at
large. This is particularly important given that recent scientific developments
have rendered it conceivable that artificial systems may soon literally possess
some of the rich psychological capacities currently ascribed to them in only a nar-
row technical sense, and many readers—including informed ones—may struggle
to determine which of these senses is being employed on a given occasion.
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Figure 1: A male Eurasian jay shares food with a female partner according to
her specific satiety. The attribution of desire-states may be an evolutionary
and developmental precursor to Theory of Mind [24]. Image provided by Ljerka
Ostojic´ (photo credit Piero Amodio and Ben Farrar).
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